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Building on recent research that examines the impact of globalization in domestic 
political behaviour, particularly on economic voting, this chapter proposes that 
globalization strengthens the influence of religiosity on individual voting decisions 
WKH µUHOLJLRXV YRWH¶ RU µUHOLJLRXV YRWLQJ¶ ,W IXUWKHU K\SRWKHVL]HV WKDW WKH HIIHFW RI
globalization on the religious vote depends on the structure of the religious economy: 
some religious contexts will be more fertile settings for religious voting. The analysis 
combines individual-level data from CSES Module 2 (2001-2006) with two types of 
country-level information: globalization indices and a measure of the religious 
context. The main finding is that globalization strengthens the link between religiosity 
and right-wing party choice. This effect can be interpreted as an anti-globalization 
backlash that takes place within a shrinking pool of religious voters. The findings 
contribute to our understanding of a hitherto ignored relationship between 
globalization and the non-economic foundations of political behaviour. 
 
 
As a key driver of societal modernization, globalization has been gathering speed in 
recent decades and especially post-1989 with positive and negative consequences across 
countries. In the standard definition by 'UHKHU*DVWRQDQG0DUWHQVDFRXQWU\¶V
openness or exposure to globalization takes place along dimensions that include cross-
border economic activity (economic globalization), as well as cultural integration (social 
globalization). Economic globalization entails, among other features, increased 
international trade flows and foreign investment, and low tariff barriers on imported 
goods. Social or cultural globalization involves a rise in the volume of international 
telephone/post/tourism traffic, and a high presence of foreigners in a given country. So, 
apart from the obvious economic transformation, globalization can be seen as a catalyst 
for changes in various fields: culture (westernization and homogenization, but also the 
erosion of traditional identities), religion (fundamentalism, but also the ecumenical 
movement), and politics (democratization, but also international terrorism).  
 
This chapter assesses whether and in what way globalization moderates the influence of 
religion in domestic political behaviour. In doing so, it updates scholarship in two 
research fields. First, comparative studies that discuss whether modernity amplifies or 
suppresses the importance of religion in political attitudes and behaviour have ignored 
the globalizing aspects of modernity (e.g. Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris 2004; Norris 
and Inglehart 2004; Esmer and Pettersson 2007). Second, an expanding body of 
scholarship that studies the influence of international processes on domestic public 
RSLQLRQ KDV IRFXVHG VR IDU RQ YRWHUV¶ HFRQRPLF FRQVLGHUDWLRQV +HOOZLJ  
Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Kayser 2007; Vowles 2008; however, see Bekhuis, 
Meuleman and Lubbers 2013). Our focus here is on the overlooked implications of 
globalization for the link between individual religiosity and party choice. We call this 
link the µreligious vote¶ to summarize the well-established cross-national tendency of the 
more devout to vote for political parties to the right of the ideological spectrum (Manza 
and Brooks 1999; Olson and Green 2006). 
 
As a first step, we use various existing theoretical perspectives to develop two 
competing expectations regarding the fate of the religious vote in the context of a 
globalizing world. According to the first expectation, globalization triggers economic 
and social/cultural changes that eventually marginalize religion to its own narrow sphere 
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(see versions in Wilson 1966; Berger 1967; Dobbelaere 2002). A weakening influence 
of religiosity on vote choice in more µopen¶ (globalized) societies would provide 
empirical support to this narrative. The second expectation anticipates the opposite 
outcome. Specifically, globalization undermines existing certainties, and generates 
existential and ontological anxiety. To combat this undesirable psychological state, 
populations retreat to sources of authority and identity that offer certainty, religion being 
a prime example of such sources (Robertson 1992; Beyer 1994; Casanova 1994; Berger 
1999; Kinnvall 2004; Held and McGrew 2007). In this reading, globalization preserves 
or even boosts the influence of religiosity on individual political decisions. A stronger 
impact of religiosity on party choice in more µopen¶ societies would provide empirical 
support to this narrative. 
 
As a second step, we combine data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
survey program (CSES Module 2: 2001-2006)  and direct measures of globalization (the 
KOF indices by Dreher et al. 2008) to produce a robust empirical test of the two 
competing narratives. Since we do not expect the impact of globalization on the 
religious vote to be homogenous across countries, we stratify our analysis by national 
religious context using measures of religious regulation (Grim and Finke 2007). For a 
more meaningful interpretation of our findings, we also supplement our analysis with 
data from the World and European Values Surveys that allow us to establish religiosity 
trends over time.  
 
The results suggest that: a) country exposure to globalization moderates the relationship 
between individual religiosity and (right-wing) party choice; b) it does so in an expected 
direction, according to one of the key narratives: greater exposure to globalization is 
linked to a stronger effect of religiosity on party choice; and c) this effect might be more 
intense only for certain religious contexts. The chapter begins with an overview of 
existing research on modernity, globalization and religion, followed by a discussion of 
JOREDOL]DWLRQ¶V UHOHYDQce for religious explanations of political behaviour. We review 
the datasets and methods, and present findings from a series of logit models. The 
conclusion discusses limitations of the analysis and key implications of our findings. 
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The Consequences of Globalization 
 
While the joint investigation of globalization and religion is a growing field of study, 
empirical research on the consequences of globalization has largely ignored the religious 
vote. Early scholarship examined the Catholic Church as one of the first global 
organizations (Valuer 1971), while more recent works have focused on the role of 
religion in shaping attitudes towards transnational trade and free-market capitalism (von 
der Ruhr and Daniels 2003), and in promoting international development and world 
peace (Banchoff 2008).  
 
Another limitation of comparative studies on religion and political behaviour is that, 
when discussing the consequences of societal modernization for religion they ignore the 
globalizing aspect of modernity by using independent variables that measure GDP, 
income inequality, human development or the size of the industrial sector (e.g. Inglehart 
and Baker 2000; Norris 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Esmer and Pettersson 2007). 
While these indicators may be related to globalization, they are not direct measures of a 
FRXQWU\¶VH[SRVXUHWRWKHIRUFHVRIJOREDOHFRQRPLFSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDORSHQQHVV 
 
Research that does employ direct measures of globalization as explanations of domestic 
political behaviour has focused so far on the µeconomic vote¶, that is the economic 
concerns of voters, rather than on the µreligious vote¶, which is of interest here (e.g. 
Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hellwig 2008; see also, Kayser 2007). 
According to this literature, globalization triggers economic, social and political changes 
that expose individuals to risk and insecurity. Individuals seek compensation and 
protection from these risks by turning to the state, particularly to its welfare functions. 
The state might be able to protect the individual (for example, through welfare 
expansion) or might be unable to countenance the negative outcomes of globalization 
(e.g. outsourcing). In the latter case, citizens might even turn to other, non-economic 
areas of government performance as their guiding considerations when choosing a party 
RQ (OHFWLRQ 'D\ 9RWHUV¶ UHDFWLRQV WRJOREDOL]DWLRQ DQG WR WKH VWDWH¶V UHDFWLRQ LQ WKLV
context, are then translated into electoral decisions. We argue that these reactions can 
incorporate a religious dimension.  
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A weaker effect of religion in political behaviour? 
 
While there is a paucity of robust evidence on the religious vote as a function of 
globalization, extant scholarship highlights two competing hypotheses. The first 
anticipates that globalization will lead to a weakening importance of religiosity in 
individual social and political decisions. This expectation draws heavily on 
modernization theory as reflected in the secularization thesis (this is a vast literature, but 
see examples in Wilson 1966; Berger 1967; Chaves 1994; Dobbelaere 2002). It asserts 
WKDW DGYDQFHG PRGHUQLW\ RI WKH NLQG SURPRWHG E\ JOREDOL]DWLRQ ZLOO FXUWDLO UHOLJLRQ¶V
relevance in the social system, leading to the eventual privatization of religion: faith will 
bear no impact on ciWL]HQV¶ VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO FKRLFHV 'HWDLOV IROORZ RQ WKH WZR
mechanisms through which globalization might be thought to constrain the religious 
vote as part of this process. 
 
In economic terms, a globalizing world is often linked to increasing affluence. If we treat 
religion as the refuge only of vulnerable populations against material deprivation, then 
improving material circumstances should decrease the individual µneed¶ for religious 
goods (see the µsecure secularization¶ thesis in Norris and Inglehart 2004). If 
globalization increases affluence, more affluent populations might feel less anxious 
regarding their well-being and, by extension, secure enough to ignore the consolations of 
religion and its promises of metaphysical rewards in the after-life. Religious faith may 
even turn into a private matter, a lifestyle µchoice¶ with little significance for social and 
political choices. The positive economic consequences of globalization prepare us for a 
GHFOLQHLQUHOLJLRQ¶VLPSRUWDQFHLQLQGLYLGXDOSROLWLFal decisions.  
 
Globalization has also been connected to how individuals see themselves (Robertson 
1992). In cultural/identity terms, globalization activates population, communication and 
information flows that build up a pluralistic environment. This allows multiple, often 
competing sources of meaning and authority to emerge, especially in previously µclosed¶ 
cultures. In these cultures, the individual used to interpret his or her existence through a 
unique (local/national) frame of reference. When exposed to the pluralistic pressures of 
globalization, a single frame of reference seizes to function as the authoritative meaning 
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system. Multiple sources of information challenge the claims of previously dominant 
meaning systems - the nation or the church - to an ultimate truth (see the µsacred canopy¶ 
metaphor in Berger 1967).
1
 Cultural relativism diminishes religious authority over the 
individual by undermining the taken-for-JUDQWHG QDWXUH RI RQH¶V IDLWK 7KLV SURFHVV
curtails the influence of faith in individual political decisions. This expectation can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 [H1a]: In more globalized countries individual religiosity will have a weaker effect on 
party choice. 
 
A stronger effect of religion in political behaviour? 
 
The recent reappearance of religious actors in national and international politics 
challenges the expectation of a religious decline in a globalizing world. This trend 
coincides with a recent wave of negative reactions towards globalization, ranging from 
xenophobia and Euro-scepticism to isolationist and protectionist policies. Defying the 
predictions of the secularization paradigm, religion often appears as a powerful public 
actor that reinforces such particularism against transnational integration. In this sense, 
globalization could produce the opposite outcomes than those described in the previous 
section: it can preserve or strengthen religious authority over the individual. Details 
follow on the two mechanism through which globalization might be thought to promote 
the religious vote. 
 
In economic terms, international integration is not necessarily linked to positive material 
outcomes for ordinary citizens. As many studies argue, globalization may undermine the 
welfare state and reduce opportunities in the job market, producing µlosers¶ across 
countries (Goesling 2001; Rodrik 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Kayser 2007).  By 
focusing on deteriorating economic circumstances, the µsecure secularization¶ thesis by 
Norris and Inglehart (2004) expects that growing income and employment insecurity 
can lead to a sense of anxiety regarding survival. A turn to religion for spiritual or 
                                                 
1
 $OWKRXJKUHODWHGWR&KULVWLDQLW\ZHXVHWKHWHUP³FKXUFK´WRGHQRWHDQ\RUJDQL]HG
religion. 
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material consolation or welfare is one of the consequences of this negative psychological 
state (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013). This retreat to religion is especially plausible 
when globalization highlights the inability of the state to enforce social protection from 
negative economic outcomes (Mishra 1999). In this sense, globalization may lead 
individuals to embrace alternative sources of authority, such as the church (Tossutti 
2002). For these reasons, cross-border economic interdependence can be seen to urge 
vulnerable populations to be more responsive towards religious messages. This account 
expects individuals to be more susceptible to religious authority, including in their 
political choices.    
 
The role of globalization in religion and politics is more often discussed with reference 
to non-economic developments (Robertson 1992; Beyer 1994; Casanova 1994; Clark 
1997; Haynes 1998; Huntington 1998; Berger 1999; Kinnvall 2004). Cultural openness 
is often seen as a challenge to established identities. It creates a feeling of embattlement. 
As a reaction, individuals might seek to reaffirm their distinctiveness by retreating to 
familiar sources of authority and identity. Religious faith and the absolute truths it 
promises are seen as key sources of stability and identity in times of anxiety. This is 
what Robertson refers to as the µinvention¶ and µimagination¶ of tradition as a reaction 
against globalization (1995: 35). A very similar expectation is shared by those who 
interpret religious fundamentalism as an anti-modernist reaction (Marty and Appleby 
1991; Tétreault and Denemark 2004). Consequently, discontent regarding global cultural 
integration is likely to reinforce religious authority over the individual, which can also 
find expression in electoral decisions.  This expectation can be summarized as follows: 
 
[H1b]: In more globalized countries individual religiosity will have a stronger effect on 
party choice. 
 
The importance of religious context 
 
Which one of these two expectations we actually observe in our data might also depend 
on local context. The idea that the outcomes of modernity - and by extension, 
globalization ± are not uniform, but depend on historical and cultural idiosyncrasies is a 
recurring one (Martin 1978; Robertson 1995; Eisenstadt 2000). For our purposes, we 
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identify a key dimension of local context that might moderate the relationship between 
globalization and the religious vote: the structure of the religious economy. The relevant 
scholarship identifies two ideal types as examples of arrangements in the religious 
economy (Iannaccone 1991). One arrangement is the open religious economy, in which 
society treats all denominations equally favourably. Society does not repress religious 
groups that do not belong to the dominant religious traditions(s). As a case in point, this 
arrangement captures the features of the American denominational experience. A second 
arrangement is a µclosed¶ religious economy, in which society is unfavourable towards 
religious groups other than the dominant one(s). Here dominant churches enjoy strong 
social support. This arrangement describes the operation of many churches in Europe, 
such as the Greek Orthodox Church.  
 
We consider countries that host closed religious economies a more fertile ground for a 
stronger effect of religiosity on political behaviour as a reaction against globalization 
(H1b). First, a dominant church operating in a socially closed religious economy 
SHUFHLYHV LWVHOI DV WKH QDWLRQ¶V YRLFH VSHDNLQJ RQ EHKDOI RI µthe people¶) and is, by 
extension, likely to be vocal on the perceived negative economic and cultural 
consequences of globalization. This is particularly relevant when political elites are seen 
as too enthusiastic about the outcomes of globalization. Second, religious voters that 
inhabit a socially open religious economy are less likely to react against social/cultural 
globalization, as they are already accustomed to the reality of pluralism and cultural 
relativism. On the contrary, religious voters that operate in a socially closed religious 
economy are more likely to react publicly in order to protect their traditionally dominant 
social position against the pressures of cultural relativism. For the same reasons, it is 
exactly in closed religious economies where political entrepreneurs are more likely to 
adopt positions that appeal to religious populations ± and therefore, that encourage 
religious voting. It is in this setting, then, that we expect to document a stronger impact 
of religiosity on vote choice. This leads to our auxiliary hypothesis (see also diagram):  
 
[H2:] The interaction effect of globalization and religiosity on party choice will be 
stronger in more µclosed¶ religious economies. 
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[Diagram about here] 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Module 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is the core database 
used in this analysis. Data limitations inherent to comparative surveys reduce our 
original sample of 39 countries and 41 election studies to 27 countries and 28 election 
studies in total. Question availability (the church attendance question has not been asked 
in all countries in Module 2) and other considerations (for instance, we could not include 
Hong Kong in our models any longer) are the main reasons for this reduction in cases. 
This is not ideal, but is not prohibitive for running the models reported below.
2
 
 
The CSES provides the two main level-1 variables used in the voting models: i) a 
dichotomous dependent variable that measures right-wing voting; and ii) the key 
independent variable of religiosity, operationalized here as church attendance. Our main 
hypothesis states that the effect of church attendance on right-wing voting is conditional 
XSRQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V µlevel¶ of globalization. While church attendance is a standard 
measure of religiosity (Olson and Green 2006), a question emerges as to what 
constitutes µright-wing¶ voting, our dependent variable. Using expert judgments on party 
families reported in the CSES we construct the dependent variable to include voting for 
conservative, Christian Democratic, religious, national, ethnic, regional, monarchist, 
extreme right and orthodox-calvinist political parties (we employ here the labelling of 
party families as it appears in the CSES data). There are few cases where we also 
                                                 
2
 Countries included in the analysis: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Korea (S), Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal (2 
elections), Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Britain, and the United States. 
Countries excluded from the analysis: Canada, Chile, Taiwan, Finland, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Norway, Peru, Russia, and Spain. 
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include right-wing liberal parties (as is the case of Forza Italia in the 2006 Italian 
General Election).  The dichotomous dependent variable is scored 1 for voters of these 
parties and 0 if otherwise in all countries. 
 
Regarding the variable that we employ to measure globalization, we use data from the 
KOF index of globalization (Dreher et al. 2008). The yearly updates of the index are 
fully comprehensive in terms of coverage, making it a valuable analytical tool especially 
for the sort of hypotheses explored here. The KOF data include various indicators that 
seek to tap into social, political, and economic facets of globalization, which form the 
KOF composite index. We use the latter. All models reported here have been replicated 
using trade openness, capital inflows, and cultural globalisation. The results remain 
substantially the same. 
 
The following equation presents the basic model specification: 
Right-wing  vote =  B1church attendance +(controls)  (level 1) 
 +B2ch. attendance*globalization (cross-level) 
 +B3globalization   (level 2) 
 
In this hierarchical model, we expect the interaction effect to be B2>0, if the relationship 
resembles H1b. Since higher values in the church attendance variable indicate higher 
frequency in churchgoing (higher value is µat least once a week¶), it is reasonable to 
expect a positive relationship with right-wing voting. So, a positive sign for B2 would 
indicate a stronger effect of church attendance on right-wing vote as globalization 
increases. Conversely, we expect the same effect to be B2<0, if the relationship 
resembles H1a. A negative sign would indicate a declining moderating role for 
globalization. Control variables include self-placement on the left-right economic 
dimension and age at the individual level, while we control for (real) GDP per capita at 
the country level. 
 
As stated in our auxiliary hypothesis (H2), we also examine the impact of globalization 
separately across two different types of religious contexts. We conduct this comparison 
via stratification of the CSES participating countries into socially closed or open 
religious economies. To operationalize religious context, we use a variable from Grim 
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DQG)LQNH¶V5HOLJLRXV)UHHGRP,QGLFHVVSHFLILFDOO\from the aggregate 2001-2003-2005 
ILOH VHHGHWDLOV LQ*ULPDQG)LQNH*ULPDQG)LQNH¶V LQGLFHVDUHEDVHGRQ WKH
quantitative coding of US State Department International Religious Freedom Reports 
and measure, among other things, government favoritism of religion (GFI) and the 
social regulation of religion (SRI). We use the SRI, because it captures bottom-up, social 
features of the religious economy, rather than a formal, legal characteristic. We focus on 
this bottom-up feature since our analysis (and our dependent variable) refers to 
individual decisions.  
 
The SRI summarizes the extent of the following in each country: negative societal 
attitudes to other religions, especially non-traditional, minority and foreign ones; 
negative attitudes toward conversions and proselytizing; existing religions shut out new 
religions; social movements oppose certain religions. This is a subtle measure of the 
social and cultural enforcement of religious uniformity in a country. It is not a measure 
of overall religiosity in a given country or of religious establishment, which is a formal, 
legal arrangement that does not provide adequate insights into how individuals view 
organized religion.  
 
We recode the original SRI in a way that splits the sample of CSES participating 
countries into two groups: those in which society is unfavourable towards other religious 
groups or µsocially closed religious economies¶ (medium or high SRI score), and those 
in which society is more comfortable with the presence of other religious groups or 
µsocially open religious economies¶ (low SRI score). Since the USA is missing from 
these reports, we have imputed its score as µlow SRI¶ (Iannaccone 1991). Table 1 
presents the composition of each group in our stratification.
3
 
                                                 
3
 The key results are robust to two alternative measures of religious context. 
Acknowledging that the SRI taps an informal dimension of the religious economy, we 
have also replicated our analysis stratifying by GFI, the more legal, administrative 
dimension that refers to state activities vis-à-vis organised religion. We have also used 
another stratifying variable from the same dataset, which measures the degree of 
religious fractionalization or competition that exists among different churches in a 
given country (how many choices of religious brand available in country). 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 reports results from multilevel logistic models with random effects. Estimating a 
pooled data model in the 28 election studies in our sample can lead to erroneous 
conclusions if there are unobserved differences between countries (Hsiao 2003; Greene 
2007). Thus we estimate a model that takes into account country-specific effects to 
ensure that unobserved differences between countries are not driving key findings. We 
have opted for a random effects estimation, which does deal with some of these potential 
problems with clustered data (see Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The first column in Table 2 reports model coefficients for the full country sample. 
Columns (2) and (3) report coefficients for the two subsamples, socially open or closed 
religious economies respectively, based on the SIR index. Some clear patterns emerge. 
First, the control variables seem to work as expected. They are correctly signed and 
significant.
4
 For example, voters who place themselves on the right end of the left-right 
scale are prone to vote for right-wing parties. The same is true for older voters. Second, 
and more importantly, the interaction term between church attendance and globalization 
is significant and positively signed in the three models. Therefore, as regards hypotheses 
H1a and H1b, it seems that the hypothesized moderating effect is present, and as H1b 
suggests, it indicates stronger religious-voting patterns in highly µglobalized¶ 
environments.  
 
However, regarding the auxiliary hypothesis H2 it is not wholly clear whether 
globalization boosts the importance of religiosity in individual voting decisions only in 
                                                 
4
 Note that additional controls for gender and income in no way alter the results 
presented here. 
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socially closed religious economies. The size of the coefficient does not really tell us 
much. In any case it is not very different from that observed in socially open religious 
economies. We attribute the negative sign of the significant main effect for church 
attendance to the fact that this coefficient reports the effect of religiosity on right-wing 
voting for the cases in which globalization levels are at their lowest. As ever, interaction 
graphs are more informative. Figures 1 to 3 graph the interaction effect between church 
attendance and globalization for the three models presented in Table 2. The graphs 
illustrate how the marginal effect of religiosity on right-wing voting changes according 
to values of the KOF index of globalization. The graphs also include the 95% 
confidence intervals, which guide us to the significance of the relationship between X on 
Y along values of Z. 
 
[Figures 1 to 3 about here] 
 
Figure 1 plots marginal effects for the full country sample. The confidence intervals 
reveal that in the lower end of the KOF index (low globalization) the link between 
religiosity and voting is actually nonexistent (except when KOF is very low). It is only 
after a certain point (in cases with a KOF score over 67) that this link becomes 
significant, and actually increases along with the index, as hypothesized in H1b. So the 
negative sign for church attendance that we observed in Table 2 is present, but as the 
confidence intervals suggest, it is not significant. And it seems to be driven by countries 
with an extremely low KOF score (e.g. Albania).  
 
Figures 2 and 3 tell essentially the same story regarding the link between church 
attendance and voting in cases where integration into the global financial and cultural 
system is very low. The more important question regarding these two figures is whether 
they carry any extra information as to the auxiliary hypothesis (H2). The moderating 
effect seems to be present in both figures, but the marginal effect is much less µsteep¶ for 
socially open religious markets (Figure 2), where the confidence intervals almost 
overlap. In other words, the moderating effect of globalization on the religious vote 
might be stronger in socially closed religious markets (Figure 3).  
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A final note is in order. Taken at face value, a stronger correlation between church 
attendance and party choice appears to support the claim that globalization may not be 
detrimental to the impact of religion in domestic politics. However, this claim can only 
be made if we look at the numbers of religious voters. In particular, a stronger impact of 
individual religiosity on right-wing vote in more globalized settings (H1b) obtains a 
different meaning if the number of religious voters remains stable ±or even goes up- 
over time than if the number of religious voters declines. If the number of religious 
voters remains stable or increases, the documented effect suggests that religion is still a 
powerful force in national elections. But if the number of religious voters declines, the 
same effect would have less dramatic implications for election results. 
 
Taking a closer look at the link between globalization and religiosity per se gives a first 
indication of what is actually happening to the pool of religious voters. Figure 4 
indicates that countries with greater exposure to globalization (KOF values in the 
horizontal axis) are less religious in terms of church attendance (CSES country averages 
in the vertical axis). Therefore, the stronger effect of attendance on right-wing vote that 
our models documented for more globalized societies seems to be a product of a 
shrinking pool of committed religious voters. There are two plausible interpretations 
here. First, as the less enthusiastic religious voters disappear, the ones left behind feel 
threatened and thus become more willing to align their political choices with their faith. 
This could serve as indication that globalization indeed generates a feeling of 
embattlement amongst the religious members of a society. The theoretical discussion 
posited that the emergence of this feeling serves as the triggering mechanism for H1b. In 
an alternative interpretation, those left behind do not experience any dramatic change in 
their electoral behaviour, but as a more homogenous group produce this stronger 
average effect regarding the religious vote. In all, the relationship in Figure 4 does not 
necessarily suggest that religion is becoming more important in election results. 
5
 
 
                                                 
5
 We have also considered the possibility that the main finding might be driven by 
processes mostly related to modernization and not globalization. All models presented 
here have been run with the inclusion of an interaction term between GDP per capita 
and church attendance and results remain unchanged.  
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[Figure 4 about here] 
 
 
The longitudinal trend produced by data from the World and European Values Surveys 
(WVS/EVS) is interesting in this respect. Tables 3 and 4 show that there has been a 
steady decline of religious practice and mass confidence in organized religion across 
most of the countries included in our analysis. In addition, the few countries that defy 
this secularization trend, those that register zero or positive change, are not necessarily 
socially closed religious economies. In other words, religiosity appears to be declining 
even in those countries in which the regression models documented a stronger positive 
effect of globalization on the religious vote. This leads us to interpret the moderating 
influence of globalization in our regression models as follows: within a shrinking 
constituency of religious voters, those who remain actively religious are more 
homogenous politically and may be becoming even more so. This is not a case of more 
people voting for right-wing parties because of religious considerations, but it seems to 
be a case of religiosity becoming more clearly associated with the right wing as a 
consequence of globalization.
 
 
 
[Tables 3 & 4 about here] 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the importance of globalization for the non-economic 
foundations of political behaviour. Combining survey data from the Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems, globalization indices, and structured information on local religious 
context, the analysis tested two widely theorized, but empirically overlooked 
expectations. In a conventional reading of the secularization thesis, the globalizing 
aspect of societal modernization was expected to suppress the importance of religiosity 
in individual decisions. The opposite expectation held that globalization would heighten 
feelings of insecurity, which would then strengthen the role of faith in individual 
choices. We proposed a model that used robust procedures to assess empirically the 
impact of globalization on the religious vote, that is, on the domestic link between 
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individual religiosity and party choice. Taking into account the structure of the religious 
economy, we also examined the impact of globalization separately for different types of 
religious contexts. 
 
The analysis was not without limitations. First, our discussion implies change over the 
long term, although the survey data at hand only allows for short-term or cross-sectional 
analyses. Second, while the country-level variables that we employed (globalization and 
religious economy) cover most countries in the world, the CSES data were limited to 
those countries that fielded a survey questionnaire, and, among the latter, to those 
countries that included the (optional) church attendance item. These countries were 
mostly industrialized economies, and almost exclusively belonged to the historical 
Christian world. Third, the discussion of the moderating role of religious context makes 
reference to certain supply-side mechanisms (responses by party elites and religious 
organizations) that may connect globalization and the religious vote. However, our 
model focuses on the examination of individual-level considerations. Finally, it has not 
escaped us that globalization may change the composition of the religious economy 
itself, for instance by facilitating the transition from a socially closed to an open 
religious economy. Yet, this type of change is glacial ± testing it would require a much 
longer series of data than the ones presently available. 
 
With these limitations in mind, WKHPRGHOVZHVSHFLILHGVXJJHVWHGWKDWDDFRXQWU\¶V
exposure to globalization indeed moderated the relationship between individual 
religiosity and (right-wing) party choice; b) it did so in the expected direction (according 
to one of the key narratives), since higher exposure to globalization was associated with 
a stronger connection between religiosity and right-wing party choice; however, c) it is 
not wholly clear whether or in what way this effect was more intense for socially closed 
than for open religious economies.  
 
Religiosity trends established with data from the World and European Values Surveys 
provided additional information that facilitated the interpretation of this result. The 
stronger effect of religiosity on vote choice that was registered in more globalized 
countries appears to be related to the ongoing decline in religiosity that affects most 
countries in our analysis. Regarding the wider electoral implications of the findings, 
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these may indicate that a contracting pool of religious voters react against the pressures 
they face in a globally integrated setting ± or at least, that this pool is becoming 
increasingly homogenous in religious and political terms. Existing research suggests the 
former scenario may be more likely (see, for example, Beyer 1994; Berger 1999; 
Tossutti 2002; Kinnvall 2004; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013).  
 
In all, the presence of a politically concrete religious minority, which is highly 
homogenous and potentially better coordinated, should be placed within the wider 
temporal context. In an era of partisan dealignment and growing disconnect between the 
general public and electoral politics, we argue that the existence of such a group 
provides powerful incentives to political entrepreneurs, especially from those parties of 
the right that wish to capitalize electorally on anti-globalization sentiments. 
 
*** 
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Table 1. CSES Module 2 countries by type of religious economy 
Socially open 
(low social regulation) 
Socially closed 
(medium/high social regulation) 
Albania Belgium 
Australia Bulgaria 
Brazil France 
Czech Republic Germany 
Denmark Israel 
Hungary Italy 
Iceland Mexico 
Ireland Netherlands 
Korea (S) Philippines 
New Zealand Poland 
Portugal (2 elections) Romania 
Sweden Slovenia 
Switzerland  
Britain  
United States  
Source:  SRI index (Grim and Finke 2007) 
 22 
 
Table 2. Logit models of right-wing party vote (stratification by religious economy) 
Sample: 
(1)  
All  
countries 
(2) 
Socially open 
religious economy 
(3) 
Socially closed 
religious economy 
 
Individual level  
   
    
Church attendance 
 
-.46*** 
(.06) 
-.19** 
(.09) 
-.82*** 
(.11) 
Ideological position (l-r) .33*** 
(.006) 
.32*** 
(.009) 
.35*** 
(.01) 
Age .002** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
 
Country level  
   
    
Globalization index -.070*** 
(.022) 
-.067** 
(.026) 
-.064* 
(.038) 
GDPpc .00008*** 
(.00002) 
.00008*** 
(.00002) 
.00008** 
(.00003) 
 
Cross-level interaction 
   
    
Church attendance × 
Globalization index 
.007*** 
(.0008) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.013*** 
(.001) 
    
Constant .60 
(1.41) 
.38 
(1.80) 
.12 
(2.32) 
Observations 27853 16164 11157 
Number of groups 28 16 12 
Source:  Survey data from CSES (Module 2); globalization data from KOF (Dreher et al. 
2008); social regulation of religion data from SRI (Grim and Finke 2007). 
Note: Random effects estimation with xtlogit in Stata 11. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).   
 
 
 23 
Table 3. Church attendance over time (% at least weekly) 
 
Country 
 
1981 
 
1990 
 
1999 2008 
 
 ǻ* 
 
       
Ireland              82 81 59 40  -42 
Belgium              30 23 18 11  -19 
Hungary              24 14 11 9  -15 
Australia            28 - 17 a 14  -14 
Mexico               59 43 56 46  -13 
Germany (W)        22 19 16 10  -12 
Netherlands          27 21 14 15  -12 
Switzerland          - 24 12 a 12  -12 
Albania              - - 20 10  -10 
Portugal             - 33 37 23  -10 
Poland               - 66 59 58  -8 
United States        44 43 45 36  -8 
France               12 10 8 6  -6 
Slovenia             - 23 17 19  -4 
Italy                36 41 40 34  -2 
New Zealand         - - 17 a 15  -2 
Britain        14 13 14 12  -2 
Korea (S)            31 21 30 30  -1 
Sweden               6 4 4 5  -1 
       
Bulgaria             - 6 9 6  0 
Czech Rep.     - 8 7 8  0 
Denmark              3 3 3 3  0 
       
Iceland              3 2 3 4  1 
Romania              - 19 25 27  8 
Brazil               - 33 36 a 48  15 
       
$YHUDJHǻVRFLDOO\RSHQUHOLJLRXVHFRQRPLHV  -7 
$YHUDJHǻVRFLDOO\closed religious economies  -1 
       
Source: WVS / EVS 
3RLQWGLIIHUHQFH PRVW UHFHQWí OHDVW UHFHQW1HJDWLYH VLJQVKRZVGHFOLQLQJ
attendance. 
a: 1995-1998 
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Table 4.  Confidence in churches over time (% great deal) 
 
Country 
 
1981 
 
1990 
 
1999 2008 
 
 ǻ* 
 
       
Ireland            52 40 22 19  -33 
Poland             - 46 33 24  -22 
United States      47 46 37 25  -22 
Belgium            25 14 11 8  -17 
Australia          21 - 12 a 7  -14 
Brazil             - 41 35 a 29  -12 
France             18 12 11 7  -11 
Albania            - - 32 23  -9 
Mexico             48 46 55 39  -9 
Germany (W)        19 12 10 11  -8 
Britain            19 16 10 11  -8 
Iceland            21 19 13 14  -7 
Korea (S)          24 21 16 17  -7 
Slovenia           - 14 12 7  -7 
Netherlands        13 9 7 9  -4 
New Zealand        - - 11 a 7  -4 
Denmark            13 10 9 10  -3 
Sweden             8 7 7 5  -3 
Hungary            16 22 18 14  -2 
Czech Rep.    9 5 8  -1 
       
Italy              28 30 27 28  0 
Portugal           - 23 35 23  0 
       
Switzerland        - - 7 a 8  1 
Bulgaria           - 12 13 14  2 
Romania            - 38 48 55  17 
       
$YHUDJHǻVRFLDOO\RSHQUHOLJLRXVHFRQRPLHV  -8 
$YHUDJHǻVRFLDOO\FORVHGUHOLJLRXVHFRQRPLHV  -6 
       
Source: WVS / EVS 
3RLQWGLIIHUHQFH PRVW UHFHQWí OHDVW UHFHQW1HJDWLYH VLJQVKRZVGHFOLQLQJ
attendance. 
a: 1995-1998 
Figure 1. The marginal effect of church attendance on right-wing vote across KOF levels (all 
countries) 
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Figure 2. Marginal effect of church attendance on right-wing vote across KOF levels (socially 
open religious economies) 
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Figure 3. Marginal effect of church attendance on right-wing vote across KOF levels (levels 
(socially closed religious economies) 
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Figure 4. Church attendance by globalization  
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Diagram. Causal Relationships 
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